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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Ryan Daniel Turnage appeals from his convictions for possession of
methamphetamine and possession of paraphernalia. He claims the district court abused its
discretion at sentencing by proceeding without a GAIN evaluation and by granting an
amended request for restitution for costs of prosecution regarding expenses for DNA
testing.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state charged Turnage with felony possession of methamphetamine (with an
enhancement for being a repeat offense) and misdemeanors for possession of paraphernalia
(second offense), and driving without privileges. (R., pp. 138-44.) The evidence against
Turnage included DNA testing on the syringe and the syringe plunger found in the car with
Turnage, matching Turnage to the DNA sample taken from the needle. (Tr., p. 310, L. 25
– p. 324, L. 1; Exhibits 9, 30-31.) At trial the court dismissed the driving without privileges
charge, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on the two possession counts, and Turnage
admitted the repeat offender enhancements. (R., pp. 150-52, 282; Tr., p. 421, L. 16 – p.
434, L. 5.) The court ordered preparation of a pre-sentence investigation report (PSI) and
a GAIN-I evaluation. (R., p. 284; Tr., p. 434, Ls. 11-17.)
At the sentencing the district court noted it had received a PSI, but the “GAIN-I
assessment actually was not completed” because Turnage “had been in custody too long
for them to administer and obtain reliable results.” (Tr., p. 439, Ls. 4-11; see also PSI, p.
20.) The court asked if there were any objections to it relying on the prepared reports and
defense counsel stated, “No objection.” (Tr., p. 440, Ls. 2-4.) Defense counsel argued that
1

a change in LSI scores showed a reduced chance for recidivism and that Turnage had a
good record on probation. (Tr., p. 441, L. 14 – p. 442, L. 18.) The defense asked for a
five-year probation, during which Turnage would have an “opportunity to have a GAIN
assessment done” so he might qualify for a specialty court. (Tr., p. 442, L. 25 – p. 443, L.
15; p. 445, Ls. 18-20.) The prosecutor also addressed the significance of a lack of a GAIN
assessment in making the state’s recommendation for retained jurisdiction. (Tr., p. 447,
Ls. 14-23.) The state argued that Turnage’s record was “too long” to go straight to
probation. (Tr., p. 447, L. 24 – p. 448, L. 5.) The district court also addressed the
significance of not having a GAIN evaluation, including that it apparently prevented the
court from putting Turnage in drug court. (Tr., p. 451, L. 4 – p. 452, L. 14; p. 456, L. 19 –
p. 457, L. 4; p. 459, Ls. 9-18.) The district court ultimately sentenced Turnage to six years
with two years determinate and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp. 296-98; Tr., p. 457, L. 14 –
p. 459, L. 8.)
The district court ordered Turnage to pay restitution for the costs of prosecution.
(Tr., p. 458, Ls. 10-17.) The state moved for restitution of $2,757.30 for the costs of
investigation and prosecution against Turnage and his co-defendant. (R., pp. 300-06.) The
state’s request was for $500 for the state lab, $87.30 for the Rexburg Police Department,
and $2,170 for DNA testing. (R., p. 300.) The restitution for the police was based on the
time spent by one officer. (R., p. 305.) The district court ordered the restitution as
requested. (R., pp. 307-12.) Turnage filed a notice of appeal within 42 days of the filing
of the court’s retained jurisdiction order and orders of restitution. (R., pp. 313-15.)
The state thereafter filed an amended motion for restitution. (R., pp. 318-26.) The
amount requested for the state lab and DNA testing was the same, but the amount requested
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for the police department was $1,798.56. (R., p. 318.) The basis for the increase was the
inclusion of the time spent by two additional officers on the case. (Compare R., p. 305
with R., pp. 323-25.) The district court granted the requested amount for reimbursement
to the police department. (R., pp. 327-28.) Thereafter, trial counsel withdrew based on
appointment of the State Appellate Public Defender. (R., pp. 329-32.)
Two days after withdrawal of trial counsel, the state filed a second amended motion
for restitution. (R., pp. 333-42.) The second amended motion asked for an additional $735
reimbursement for the prosecutor’s office for additional DNA testing. (Compare R., p. 318
with R., p. 333.) The district court granted the restitution request. (R., p. 343.)
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ISSUES
Turnage states the issues on appeal as:
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by sentencing Mr. Turnage
without the benefit of a substance use and mental health evaluation?

II.

Did the district court deprive Mr. Turnage of his right to counsel by
allowing his attorney to withdraw during restitution proceedings?

(Appellant’s brief, p. 5.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Turnage failed to show fundamental error because the district court did not
order a continuance of the sentencing hearing to obtain an evaluation where Turnage did
not request any such continuance?
2.
Has Turnage failed to show fundamental error in the district court’s order granting
his counsel’s motion to withdraw, or in its granting of the second amended restitution
motion thereafter?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Turnage Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error Because The District Court Did Not
Order A Continuance Of The Sentencing Hearing To Obtain An Evaluation Where
Turnage Did Not Request Any Such Continuance
A.

Introduction
Turnage argues for the first time on appeal that the district court abused its

discretion by proceeding with sentencing without a GAIN evaluation or a specific waiver
of such an evaluation. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 6-9.) Because Turnage did not object to
proceeding to sentencing without a GAIN evaluation or a specific waiver, he has the burden
of showing fundamental error. He has failed to attempt to meet that burden.

B.

Standard Of Review
A claim of error unpreserved for appellate review by a timely objection may only

be considered on appeal if it “constitutes fundamental error.” State v. Johnson, 149 Idaho
259, 265, 233 P.3d 190, 196 (Ct. App. 2010). In the absence of an objection “the appellate
court’s authority to remedy that error is strictly circumscribed to cases where the error
results in the defendant being deprived of his or her Fourteenth Amendment due process
right to a fair trial in a fair tribunal.” State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961, 976
(2010). Review without objection will not lie unless (1) the defendant demonstrates that
“one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights were violated”; (2) the
constitutional error is “clear or obvious” on the record, “without the need for any additional
information” including information “as to whether the failure to object was a tactical
decision”; and (3) the “defendant must demonstrate that the error affected the defendant’s
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substantial rights,” generally by showing a reasonable probability that the error “affected
the outcome of the trial court proceedings.” Id. at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.

C.

Turnage Has Failed To Show That His Claim Of Error Is Preserved For Appellate
Review Or That It Is Fundamental Error
Turnage did not timely object to the trial court proceeding to sentencing without an

evaluation or a waiver of an evaluation. At the start of the sentencing hearing, the district
court noted the lack of a GAIN evaluation, and why. (Tr., p. 439, Ls. 4-11.) The court
asked if there were any objections and defense counsel stated, “No objection.” (Tr., p. 440,
Ls. 2-4.) The defense argued for probation, stating that Turnage could get a GAIN
evaluation upon his release. (Tr., p. 442, L. 25 – p. 443, L. 15; p. 445, Ls. 18-20.) Because
the defense did not ask for a continuance in order to secure a GAIN evaluation or some
substitute evaluation, and registered no objection to proceeding without an evaluation or
affirmative waiver, the claim of error he asserts on appeal was not preserved for appellate
review.
Nor does Turnage make any attempt to show that the error he claims is fundamental.
He does not claim he had a constitutional right to a sentencing evaluation. Rather, his
asserted right is entirely statutory. He has not shown that his decision to not request a
continuance of sentencing to obtain an evaluation was not a tactical decision. Rather, his
counsel specifically incorporated the lack of an evaluation in an argument that Turnage
should be granted probation so he could obtain such an evaluation. Finally, Turnage has
shown no prejudice because he has failed to show that he would ultimately have obtained
a different sentencing result had he objected to proceeding without the evaluation. None of
the three elements of a fundamental error claim were established by Turnage on the record.
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A GAIN evaluation could not be performed in this case because it would not result
in a reliable result (Tr., p. 439, Ls. 4-11; PSI, p. 20), a situation the district court found
frustrating (see Tr., p. 451, L. 4 – p. 452, L. 14; p. 456, L. 19 – p. 457, L. 4; p. 459, Ls. 918). As a practical matter, only two things could have been done at that point: either move
forward with the sentencing or continue the sentencing to explore possible options of
obtaining some other sort of evaluation. By moving forward, the court essentially waived
preparation of the report. Having failed to request a continuance, and in fact instead
incorporating the absence of an evaluation into the sentencing argument, Turnage has failed
to show error by the district court.

II.
Turnage Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In The District Court’s Order Granting
His Counsel’s Motion To Withdraw, Or In Its Granting Of The Second Amended
Restitution Motion Thereafter
A.

Introduction
At the sentencing, the district court ordered Turnage to pay restitution “in full.”

(Tr., p. 458, Ls. 12-15.) The state submitted a restitution request and an amended
restitution request, and the district court ordered restitution for costs of investigation and
prosecution of $500 to the state lab for drug testing, $1,798.56 to the police for costs of
investigation, and $2,170 to the county for costs of DNA testing. (R., pp. 300-12, 318-28.)
Thereafter, Turnage’s trial counsel moved for appointment of the State Appellate Public
Defender and to withdraw. (R., pp. 329-30.) The district court granted the motion to
appoint the State Appellate Public Defender to represent Turnage and for trial counsel to
withdraw. (R., pp. 331-32.) After the appointment of the State Appellate Public Defender
to represent Turnage, the state filed a second amended motion for restitution requesting an
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additional $735 for DNA testing based on a second bill submitted by the laboratory. (R.,
pp. 333-42.) The district court granted the additional request. (R., p. 343.) Fifteen days
later, the State Appellate Public Defender, who represented Turnage because of the
previously entered order appointing them to represent Turnage, filed an amended notice of
appeal in the district court. (R., pp. 345-50.)
On appeal, the Deputy State Appellate Public Defender, who is a lawyer and
represents Turnage because of the order the district court entered appointing the State
Appellate Public Defender when it allowed trial counsel to withdraw, claims that Turnage
was unrepresented by counsel when the second amended restitution motion was granted,
and therefore he was denied counsel. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 9-13.) Turnage’s argument
fails, primarily because he was represented by counsel at all relevant times.

B.

Standard Of Review
A trial court may appoint substitute counsel for an indigent defendant upon a

showing of good cause; such decision lies within the sound discretion of the trial
court. State v. Nath, 137 Idaho 712, 714-715, 52 P.3d 857, 859-860 (2002); State v.
Clayton, 100 Idaho 896, 897, 606 P.2d 1000, 1001 (1980). An abuse of discretion will
only be found where the denial of substitute counsel results in the abridgment of the
accused’s right to counsel. State v. Priest, 128 Idaho 6, 11, 909 P.2d 624, 629 (Ct. App.
1995).

C.

Turnage Was Represented By Counsel At All Relevant Times
“A defendant’s constitutional right to counsel only extends to the ‘critical stages’

of proceedings. It therefore follows that, if the stage is not critical, there can be no
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constitutional violation, no matter how deficient counsel’s performance.” Murray v. State,
156 Idaho 159, 164, 321 P.3d 709, 714 (2014) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
“In determining whether a particular stage is ‘critical,’ it is necessary ‘to analyze whether
potential substantial prejudice to defendant’s rights inheres in the particular confrontation
and the ability of counsel to help avoid that prejudice.’” Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558,
562, 149 P.3d 833, 837 (2006) (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1981)).
The state’s second amended restitution motion was not a critical stage of the
criminal proceedings. The trial court ordered “full restitution” at the sentencing hearing,
when Turnage was represented by trial counsel. (Tr., p. 458, Ls. 12-15.) It subsequently
ordered restitution to the state lab and to the Rexburg Police Department, again while
Turnage was represented by trial counsel. (R., pp. 307-310, 318-19.) It ordered restitution
to the county for its payment to the DNA lab in the amount of $2,170, when Turnage was
represented by trial counsel. (R., pp. 311-12.) Thus, at the time the court ordered the
additional restitution of $735 to the county for the DNA lab, the order challenged by
Turnage on appeal, the court had already ordered restitution in full, and Turnage, through
counsel, had not objected to restitution to the county for the costs of the DNA evaluations
it performed and admitted at trial. Whether to award the additional $735 was, under the
procedure here, not a critical stage of the proceedings. See State v. Hartshorn, 149 Idaho
454, 458, 235 P.3d 404, 408 (Ct. App. 2010) (“a post-judgment hearing upon a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea is not a critical stage for purposes of the Sixth Amendment”).
Indeed, there was no potential substantial prejudice to Turnage’s rights inherent in the
particular confrontation of the second amended restitution motion that counsel could help
to avoid. See Estrada, 143 Idaho at 562, 149 P.3d at 837.
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Turnage acknowledges that Idaho courts have not determined the scope of the right
to counsel in relation to restitution proceedings, but argues that all matters related to
restitution are critical stages because (1) “even a relatively small restitution award can be
crippling” and “it doesn’t stop there” because ordered restitution may accrue interest; and
(2) “restitution proceedings can be both factually and legally complex.” (Appellant’s brief,
pp. 10-13.) He contends that Hayes v. State, 143 Idaho 88, 137 P.3d 475 (Ct. App. 2006),
supports his claim that restitution proceedings are critical stages. (Appellant’s brief, pp.
10-11.) Hayes, however, addressed a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing
to advise him of the possibility of restitution prior to entry of a guilty plea. Hayes, 143
Idaho at 93, 137 P.3d at 480. There is no reason to believe that a guilty plea is not a critical
stage of the proceedings to which the right of counsel attaches.
Turnage’s failure to address the facts of this case dooms his argument. The district
court ordered the restitution at the sentencing hearing. (Tr., p. 458, Ls. 12-15.) A
sentencing hearing is undoubtedly a critical stage of the proceedings but, as noted above,
trial counsel represented Turnage at that proceeding. Moreover, Turnage was represented
by trial counsel when the trial court determined that restitution for DNA testing costs was
appropriate. The only decision the trial court made after the withdrawal of trial counsel
and appointment of the State Appellate Public Defender was that a second invoice for those
costs was also subject to payment. Turnage has failed to demonstrate why, under these
facts, “potential substantial prejudice to defendant’s rights inheres in the particular
confrontation and the ability of counsel to help avoid that prejudice.” Estrada, 143 Idaho
at 562, 149 P.3d at 837 (internal quotes and citation omitted).
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More importantly, Turnage was not “denied” counsel. In the same order allowing
withdrawal of trial counsel, the district court appointed the State Appellate Public Defender
to represent Turnage. (R., p. 331.) The state requests this Court to take judicial notice that
the State Appellate Public Defender and his deputies are lawyers. Those lawyers could
have assisted Turnage in responding to the second amended motion for restitution, or could
have assisted Turnage to get trial counsel re-appointed to address that motion if there was
any reason to oppose it. Turnage has failed to show that appointment of the State Appellate
Public Defender was a denial of counsel.
In this case Turnage was represented by trial counsel when the court ordered
restitution and when it ordered restitution for DNA testing expenses. Submission of a
second invoice to get the full amount of that particular part of the restitution was not a
critical stage of the proceeding. Even if it were critical, Turnage was represent by counsel
because, in the same order it allowed trial counsel to withdraw, the trial court appointed
the State Appellate Public Defender to represent Turnage. Turnage has failed to show the
trial court denied him the assistance of counsel.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment and the Second
Amended Order for Restitution.
DATED this 25th day of September, 2018.

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 25th day of September, 2018, served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below
by means of iCourt File and Serve:
MAYA P. WALDRON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
KKJ/dd
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